Information about the group of Russian agents conducting such activities in Podkarpacie was given by RMF FM on Wednesday.
ABW was to stop six people working for Russia, who installed cameras enabling traffic on tracks and roads leading to Ukraine.
On Thursday, the detention and prosecution of espionage to six people “from behind the eastern border” confirmed the head of the Ministry of Interior and Administration Mariusz Kamiński.
They were to “prepare diversion acts on behalf of a Russian intelligence”.
Region of special importance
is a serious matter by all means.
After more than a year of open conflict, you could get used to it and forget a little, but it is invariably a fact that Poland is a NATO front state.
Podkarpackie roads and railway lines have a strategic dimension as part of this war.
Accurate data on supported support for Ukraine are obviously closed.
It even manages to maintain an informal civil discipline and very few recordings of transports made by random people go to the network, which in the era of ubiquitous cameras in cars and smartphones is proof of a decent discipline of society.
There is no doubt, however, that the scale of these transports is significant.
It must be because it is through Poland that the most convenient supply routes from the West to Ukraine lead.
There are also Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, but all these countries have worse road and rail connections with Ukraine, and above all with West Europe.
The Rzeszów-Jasionka airport with its three-kilometer starting road near the border, capable of accepting the heaviest transport aircraft, became the main air supply center from other continents.
The exact number of flights taken is not public, but many aircraft, whether civilian or military, land in Rzeszów with transponders turned on.
So they are visible on portals traffic.
You can regularly see them even a dozen a dozen a day, and these are only those that had transponders turned on.
Weapons, ammunition, fuel and many other materials flowing through Podkarpackie are of cardinal importance for the course of the war.
Especially points 2 and 3, i.e. ammunition and fuel.
It can be assumed with high probability that without this support from the West Ukraine would have already succumbed to Russia or at least much worse.
The Russians are aware of this.
You can regularly hear the ruling to western deliveries from the highest level of the Kremlin hierarchy or from chief propagandists.
Different Russian military commentators on a telegram for a year have poured regrets for the inability to cut off or at least limiting this stream of help.
limited possibilities of Russians
Fortunately, the Russian army is unable to do so by conventional methods.
In practice, only aviation could do this by conducting raids aimed at trains or road convoys.
Having hit such purposes, however, is a precise work that requires operating combat aircraft over western Ukraine.
However, this Russians cannot do because of the strong and effective Ukrainian anti -aircraft defense, which makes hunting for trains or trucks practical impossibility.
At least not at the level of skill that Russian aviation presented.
More specifically, inability to systematically combat Ukrainian anti -aircraft defense.
Attacking with long -range or ballistic missiles from Belarus is also impractical due to the weakness of Russian diagnosis.
Preparing and conducting such a hit requires at least many hours and precise information on where and when a train or truck will be or where they will stop for unloading/transhipment.
Without this, it is impossible to develop the appropriate data to aim missiles.
There is also an important possibility of assessing the effects of the attack.
The relevant information could come from traffic observation on tracks and roads with the help of satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, drones, subversive and reconnaissance groups or informants.
The Russians almost do not have the second and third ones with appropriate parameters too.
Before the fourth and fifth factor, Ukrainians apparently guard well, because after more than a year of war there is no information about the files of sabotage in the west of their country.
Apparently, however, attempts are made.
Perhaps it was considered that it would be easier in Poland, which is not at war.
The more that a significant number of Belarusians and Ukrainians have arrived in our country over the past three years.
In such a crowd it is easier to hide so -called illegal (employees of services operating in a foreign state illegally and intravenously) or to recruit colleagues.
Shapes of information help build an image
What could the Russians watch the Rzeszów airport and transport routes towards the Ukrainian border?
Rather not data appropriate to plan air beats on the Ukrainian side of the border.
Cameras would not allow to assess where and when transports will move around Ukraine.
However, they could provide valuable information about the scale and distribution of deliveries over time.
For example, nobody informs publicly whether the Ukrainians have already received the promised Patriot anti -aircraft systems.
However, their elements are very characteristic and are difficult to hide completely in transport.
The Russian cameras could therefore see their movement towards the border.
However, this would be valuable information for the Russian aviation command, which would know that he would have to start using appropriate remedies, because for example, for example, a week of the possibilities of Ukrainian anti -aircraft defense will change significantly.
Similarly, cameras could provide information on the scale and time of delivery of heavy combat vehicles, which cannot be completely hidden.
Covering with a tarpaulin does not make the tank unrecognizable.
Knowledge about how many heavy vehicles were taken to the border or when the supply increased, it can be a valuable contribution to building the assessment of the formation process of new Ukrainian reserve brigades.
However, this can translate into the assessments of the Russians as to the time and scale of the potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Similarly, ammunition transports.
This is much easier to mask, because it is difficult to recognize what is going in the interior of the truck or the usual closed wagon.
In the case of ammunition, however, it is not about precise numbers, but a scale.
The work of the interview often involves trying to draw conclusions from very residual information.
A clear increase in the number of ordinary trucks leaving the Rzeszów airport or wagons going to Medyka (the main Polish-Ukrainian border crossing) can also be an circumstantial.
Especially how information from other sources, such as informants, is added to this.
Similarly to the Cysternes wagons carrying the Ukrainian army, fuel and lubricants.
A clear increase in their number may, for example, indicate the accumulation of stocks before the planned offensive activities, during which the consumption of propeller materials significantly increases.
so ordinary cameras hidden on the roads and tracks in Podkarpacie could be a source of valuable intelligence information for Russians.
According to Minister Kamiński, however, it was also about “preparing acts of diversion”.
Does this mean that next to the collection of information, the net was preparing any attacks?
The Russians can do it, as evidenced by explosions in ammunition and factories in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria over the past decade.
It remains to be hoped that the net was discovered and liquidated quickly, not after a year of operation.